REQUEST FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT’S PROGRESS ON ITS INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITMENTS

  • Lucas Rekers (Director, Climate Ethics and Development Foundation)

  • Juan Bautista López (Lecturer in Natural Resources and Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, National University of Córdoba)

REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The Argentine Republic has enacted and ratified various national and international instruments related to tackling the effects of climate change. From a legal perspective, the State can therefore be said to have a regulatory microsystem relating to the phenomenon. It includes highly significant international treaties such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1), the Kyoto Protocol (2) and the Paris Agreement (3). Domestically, it has passed laws on various sectoral environmental matters and, in particular, a minimum standards law (4) to govern and set guidelines for public policy and climate change adaptation and mitigation actions.

In this regard, the State has made significant climate action commitments to the international community. These are reflected in specific instruments that must be prepared and submitted to multilateral bodies, including National Communications, National Mitigation and Adaptation Plans, Nationally Determined Contributions (hereinafter NDCs), Biennial Update Reports, biennial inventory reports and Biennial Transparency Reports, among others.

In this context, this report stems from a request for access to public environmental information submitted on 14 October 2024 to the Office of the Chief of Cabinet of Ministers. The purpose of the request was to find out about the progress and development of climate actions and thereby assess that performance and other associated variables such as climate finance, budget allocation and institutional set-up.

The following paragraphs analyse and assess the answers provided. First, the regulatory framework underlying each question is set out. The answer is then detailed. Next, the substance of the action is assessed in the light of the regulatory framework, the local and international context and other variables obtained after the response. Throughout, the particular characteristics of climate change and their bearing on the measure examined are considered. Finally, an overall conclusion on the points covered is presented.

The context from the government’s narrative

Javier Milei took office as President of the Argentine Republic on 10 December 2023. From the outset and throughout his term, the executive has presented society with a clear narrative on anthropogenic climate change.

In his various speeches, the President has taken a critical stance on the climate action agenda. In different local and international settings, he has portrayed policies and actions against climate change as a reflection of a “neo-Marxist” agenda that threatens the individual freedom his government fiercely protects. Along these lines, he has described climate change as a phenomenon unrelated to human activity and inherent to the natural course of events (5).

Within this set of ideas, he has also framed nature as a resource meant to serve humanity. He has also called the “environmentalist agenda” “insane”, linking it to the idea of not polluting the planet, which, by his own argument, would mean eliminating human life (6).

So far, the President has avoided any reference to the prevailing scientific consensus. Although he has implied that it is a cyclical and natural phenomenon, he has not explicitly rejected the studies on its causes, consequences and effects agreed by the international scientific community.

He has also expressed opposition to the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, which he likewise sees as a “socialist” programme that violates the sovereignty of States and individual rights. He stated, for example, that this agenda had set humanity on a tragic course (7).

Beyond rhetoric, some concrete actions have reflected this thinking in practice. One example is the dissociation from the so-called “Pact for the Future”, adopted by consensus at the United Nations General Assembly during its 2024 sessions (8). Another is the reduction of the national budget allocated to research, with clear consequences for the duty of States to implement policies that strengthen climate science research.

In this context, it is necessary to assess whether this affects the institutional development of the climate agenda, and whether certain government actions create barriers and challenges to the full implementation of international commitments.

Access to public information: procedural aspects

The Escazú Agreement (9) and domestic minimum standards laws set certain procedural standards that the administration must respect when responding to a request for public environmental information. These include not requiring the requester to demonstrate any legal standing; identifying and referring the request to the authority holding the information where the authority addressed does not hold it; free access; delivery in the requested format; and access to information on environmental management policies, plans, programmes and actions, among others. A period of 30 working days is also set for responding (10). In the event of non-compliance, the law itself provides for possible sanctions against the officials responsible.

The request for access was submitted on 14 October 2024. The response was given on 3 December of the same year. Based on that year’s official calendar, 35 working days elapsed before the reply, meaning it was five working days beyond the legal deadline. This is not a significant delay.

In comparative terms, this is somewhat positive, as provincial and municipal jurisdictions commonly exceed the legal deadlines by a wide margin. In some jurisdictions, requests are answered only after the courts have been asked to compel a response.

As for the information requested, the request covered 8 different topics with a total of 21 questions. The response identifies each question and then provides the associated information. It is clearly structured, which makes it easy to read and follow. It also includes hyperlinks to various working websites that contain digitised documents relating to each point requested.

In this request, the standards mentioned were partially met. The request respected the principles of free access, broad legal standing and delivery in the requested format (digital). However, for two of the questions, the information requested did not fall within the remit of the authority addressed. In those cases, the competent authority was indicated, but the request was not forwarded to it ex officio. This is a minor failure to observe the standards mentioned. On the other hand, looking ahead, the authority provided answers on actions, plans and policies even when these were still being developed.

Overall, taking into account the guidelines outlined, it can be said that the department addressed satisfactorily fulfilled its obligations regarding access to public environmental information. This conclusion applies to the specific request and to the area that responded. There is not enough evidence to assess the functioning of the public environmental information access system as a whole.

  • On the Nationally Determined Contribution

Brief background

The Paris Agreement requires States Parties to submit a Nationally Determined Contribution every five years, setting out mitigation and adaptation actions aimed at achieving the treaty’s objectives (11). Although no objective parameters are set for their content, contributions must show progressive rather than regressive development. In the words of the Agreement itself, they must reflect a “higher level of ambition” and not a step backwards compared with previous contributions.

The decision adopting the text of the treaty set 2020 as the date for the first NDC (12). Given the five-year cycle, the next submission falls due in 2025. Within these obligations, Argentina submitted its second Nationally Determined Contribution in 2020 (updated in 2021). Like all other States Parties, it must therefore submit its third NDC in 2025.

Question asked and information provided

Against this background, the request asked about progress in preparing the NDC. It also requested information on the inclusion of health in that instrument.

The authority reported that the process of preparing the third contribution had not yet begun at the date of the response. It explained that at the First Meeting of Ministers of the National Cabinet, held on 23 September 2024, it had been agreed to start the preparation process. The minutes of that meeting asked the “Focal Points Roundtable”, together with the Technical and Administrative Coordination, to put in place the actions needed to plan and work jointly and in coordination on its preparation for submission in 2025. They also urged the so-called “Focal Points” to take an active part in the NDC so that it reflects more ambitious and up-to-date mitigation and adaptation actions (13).

Regarding the targets included in the National Adaptation Plan and the health sector National Adaptation Plan, the public body referred to the National Health and Climate Change Strategy approved in 2023. It did not specify whether this strategy was being used as an input for the NDC. As for the latter, it simply stated that health had been included as a guiding axis in its second version. Finally, it specified that this axis was reflected in the second National Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Plan. On the third point, which requested information on the preparation process, the authority referred to its first answer.

Assessment of the answers

At the date of the response, it was stated that a cabinet agreement required the process of preparing the third NDC to begin. It can be said that, at that date, there was still no coordination among the various institutional departments involved in preparing the contribution. The initiative and the call to these departments at least show an intention to fulfil the obligation to submit this instrument in 2025.

The information provided raises the following questions. First, whether the authorities responsible for preparing the NDC have the resources and technical capacity to ensure smooth coordination to meet the 2025 goal. Second, even in favourable circumstances, whether the State can carry out the necessary actions (diagnoses, studies and technical assessments of climate variables across all areas) in the time remaining. It should be stressed that the five-year period set by the Paris Agreement is not arbitrary: it is a reasonable and necessary time frame for the careful and robust development of each NDC.

This question becomes even more pressing when considering the obligations the State must meet after ratifying the Escazú Agreement. Under this instrument, in cases such as the preparation of an NDC, the State is required to put in place effective public participation mechanisms and processes.

There are also additional contextual challenges. Government actions such as budget and staff cuts and the downgrading of ministries, among other factors, make it even harder to consider the institutional environment favourable to developing the NDC properly and on time.

In this respect, the third contribution must embody a higher level of ambition, not stagnation or regression. This clearly requires an in-depth analysis of the commitments made in the second contribution, an assessment of how far they have been met and how effective they have been, and a real possibility of committing to more advanced or ambitious climate actions.

Notwithstanding these questions, it is worth noting that the government narrative described at the beginning of this report does not appear to have permeated the intentions of the specific areas responsible for international commitments since, as shown, the relevant departments have been urged to begin preparing the NDC.

  • On the Biennial Update Report

Brief background

Developing-country Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (including Argentina) were required to submit so-called “Biennial Update Reports” (hereinafter BURs) to its implementing bodies. These had to contain updated information on the national greenhouse gas inventory, mitigation measures adopted and needs, and the support received. As the name suggests, BURs were submitted every two years. This requirement applied until the Paris Agreement was signed.

Following the Paris Agreement, BURs were replaced by Biennial Transparency Reports [hereinafter BTRs (14)]. At the 2018 COP, 31 December 2024 was set as the deadline for their submission. This was therefore the expected submission date for these reports, without prejudice to earlier BUR submissions.

The content of BTRs is set out in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. In addition to reporting on the inventory of anthropogenic emissions and removals, they must provide the information needed to track progress made and assess the implementation of each Party’s NDC. In other words, they are closely linked to the latter instrument.

Question asked and information provided

In this context of obligations, the administration was asked about progress on the BUR.

The body reported that the fifth BUR had been submitted in 2023. It also stated that the first Biennial Transparency Report would be submitted before 31 December 2024, and added that it would contain the historical series of the greenhouse gas inventory up to and including 2022.

Assessment of the response

The “Argentina.gob.ar” website confirms that the report was completed, and the United Nations climate change portal shows that it was actually submitted (15). This shows that the commitment made under this framework was met within the stipulated deadlines.

In this respect, the answer was sufficient and complete with regard to the point requested. The administration showed precise knowledge of the change in the report to be submitted, the deadline and the nature of its content. One shortcoming is that the greenhouse gas inventory is out of date (up to 2022). This is concerning given the diagnostic value of this tool for sound decision-making. It also raises the question of how the challenge of updating the inventory for 2023 and 2024 will be addressed so that it can be used and incorporated in preparing the third NDC due in 2025.

  • On the National Climate Change Cabinet

Brief background

The National Climate Change Cabinet (hereinafter GNCC) is a body established by Chapter II of Minimum Standards Law No. 27.520 on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation. It is chaired by the Chief of Cabinet of Ministers and made up of the heads of the various national ministries.

Its main function is to implement the National Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Plan and all public policy related to the application of the law. It is also tasked with coordinating between the different areas of national government and provincial authorities. Its structure includes the Technical and Administrative Coordination, responsible for preparing documents and inputs to meet institutional objectives.

- The law’s implementing decree also provides for the GNCC to be assisted by “Roundtables”, each with different working groups. These are:

- Focal Points Roundtable: made up of one designated representative from each of the ministries that form the GNCC.

- Provincial Coordination Roundtable: made up of the representatives of each province on the Climate Change Commission of the Federal Environment Council (COFEMA).

- Extended Roundtable: made up of any other person or organisation with an interest in the subject.

It is also supported in developing public policy by an External Advisory Council (hereinafter CAE). This is a permanent, consultative body, although its input must be taken into account. It can be described as a body that encourages the participation of other civil society actors, as it is made up of climate change scientists, experts and researchers; environmental organisations, trade unions, Indigenous communities, research centres, academic and business organisations; and representatives of political parties with seats in Congress.

Question asked and information provided

The request asked whether the GNCC was active, which areas and officials it comprised, how often it met and what its institutional contact channel was.

The administration reported that the body was active and that its first meeting had taken place on 23 September 2024. It dealt with technical matters relating to international obligations, such as those associated with compliance with Law 27.520, and other operational issues. It then stated that the Cabinet’s Provincial Coordination Roundtable met on 5 November 2024 to present the draft Provincial Response Plans of La Pampa, Misiones and Jujuy. On 7 November of the same year, it added, the Extended Roundtable met. Although the report of that meeting was not available at the time of the response, it provided the link to the video recording (16).

As for the appointment of ministerial focal points, it reported that they were in the process of being appointed so that the corresponding (Focal Points) Roundtable could then be held. It stressed that this body was responsible for preparing the inputs needed for the third NDC. Finally, it stated that the procedure for setting up the External Advisory Council had been initiated for 2025.

Regarding the areas and officials that make up the GNCC, the response referred to the institutional structures without naming specific people, and to the internal rules of each department. It did, however, also refer to the Minutes of Ministers’ Meeting No. 1/24, where it indicated the attendees could be seen. As for communication channels, it only mentioned the existence of email addresses without specifying them.

Lastly, it stated that the area was not responsible for reporting on the allocated budget, which was the responsibility of the budget office of the Deputy Chief of Cabinet for the Interior. This information also answers the questions asked in item 5 regarding the External Advisory Council and its composition. As for its contact channel, it reported that the email address was: cae@ambiente.gob.ar.

Assessment of the response

The answers show that, at the time they were prepared, only one meeting had been held between ministers to plan their future activities. As for the rest of the GNCC structure, the Provincial Coordination Roundtable and the Extended Roundtable each met only once. In contrast, the Focal Points Roundtable, the External Advisory Council and the respective working groups did not meet during 2024. The CAE had not been set up as required by the climate change minimum standards law.

From a quantitative perspective, 3 of the 5 institutional structures that make up the GNCC met, each only once during the year. This must be weighed against the substantial international commitments the Argentine State will soon have to meet, as it is difficult to reconcile the stated goals with the level of coordination among the areas responsible for achieving them.

From a qualitative perspective, the meetings held did not bring substantial progress on the GNCC’s mission. Instead, they focused on operational and forward-looking matters. This undoubtedly creates a situation that jeopardises the fulfilment of institutional responsibilities and calls for the work agenda to be reviewed and strengthened.

It may be necessary to look into the possible causes of this limited activity. Possible explanations include transition periods between administrations, the restructuring of ministries and reduced resources, and a lack of commitment to the climate agenda, among other variables.

  • On the GNCC’s Technical and Administrative Coordination and the Climate Change Adaptation Coordination

Brief background

As shown in the previous item, the GNCC’s Technical and Administrative Coordination (CTA) is the engine that drives and prepares the inputs needed for the GNCC to fulfil its mission.

Question asked and information provided

Information was requested on the person in charge of this coordination. It was reported that the Coordination was headed by the Under-Secretary for the Environment, Dr Ana María Vidal de Lamas. As a contact channel, the GNCC email address (gncc@ambiente.gob.ar) was provided.

As for the Climate Change Adaptation Coordination (a department operating under the Under-Secretariat for the Environment), it was reported that it had had no one in charge since 5 September 2024. The department’s email address was provided: cambioclimatico@ambiente.gob.ar

Assessment of the response

As noted in the assessment of the previous answers, there is a clear shortcoming in the set-up and staffing of certain institutional spaces. Among them, the resignation and vacancy of the team in charge of the Climate Change Adaptation Coordination affects the capacity for an institutional response with a view to preparing the third NDC.

  • On participation in the 29th Conference of the Parties in Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan

Brief background

The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the body responsible for driving actions to achieve the treaty’s objectives. It is made up of all States Parties, meets once a year and is held in different parts of the world. In this context, the COP also serves as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and assesses the level of implementation.

Participation in COPs is key to climate action on a phenomenon that, being multi-scale, multifaceted, multidisciplinary and cross-border by nature, requires multilateral and global governance. At these meetings, the international community negotiates to implement the necessary actions, provide finance, assess processes and results, and set new targets. Civil society also takes part in these spaces. Its involvement helps reshape classic multilateralism between States into a horizontal, bottom-up version, making it possible to coordinate strategies beyond State level.

Question asked and information provided

The request asked about the Argentine Republic’s participation in COP29. The administration reported that participation was led by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was responsible for registering Argentine representatives with the event organisers. Officials from that ministry also acted as “Head of Delegation” of the official Argentine delegation. It recommended consulting that ministry, without forwarding the request to it ex officio.

Assessment of the response

On this point, the body responding provided information on the State area responsible for managing the official delegation to the COP (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and indicated that the request should be addressed to it. On grounds of competence, and based on access to information standards, the request should have been forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Notwithstanding the answer given, what happened at COP29 must be examined. During the conference, after the delegation had arrived in Azerbaijan, the Argentine Government decided to withdraw from the event and not take part (17). As a result, the Republic was absent from all negotiations and interventions. As a further consequence, civil society members who were associated with the delegation as “party overflow” (18) during the event abruptly lost their accreditation and, with it, their access.

This decision marks a turning point in Argentina’s historic commitment to taking an active part in COPs and being an important voice for the region. Moreover, the decision is not in line with the nationally determined contributions committed to by the Republic in 2022. It sends a clear message to the international community about the importance the current administration attaches to the COP and to climate change.

  • On the Jurisdictional Response Plans

Brief background

Argentina is a federal state. This means there are two spheres of power that interact in relation to the territory: the Federal (or National) State on the one hand, and the provinces on the other. The provinces are autonomous, while a federal unity is sought that ensures the coexistence of both levels.

In exercising this autonomy, the provinces retain all powers not expressly delegated to the Federal State. There are, therefore, powers reserved to the provinces, powers delegated to the Federal State and some concurrent powers, which both exercise jointly.

On environmental matters, the rule is that the provinces are responsible for managing the ecosystems and resources within their territory. However, given the interconnected and interdependent nature of the environment and the fact that it extends beyond political boundaries, comprehensive management based on agreement among all levels of government is needed.

In legislative terms, the Federal State must enact so-called minimum environmental protection standards laws. These set minimum thresholds of environmental protection that apply compulsorily and uniformly throughout the country, including in the provinces. The provinces, for their part, must enact regulations with complementary provisions without falling below the minimum threshold set by the Nation. In other words, provincial jurisdictions must set environmental protection standards equal to or higher than those set nationally, maximising protection.

With regard to climate change, this system led to the enactment of the minimum standards law on climate change adaptation and mitigation. It requires a national climate change adaptation and mitigation plan to be drawn up, and requires the provinces to do the same within their own local socio-environmental context. This instrument is called the “Provincial Response Plan” (hereinafter PRP).

PRPs must be submitted to and validated by the law’s National Enforcement Authority, which is obliged to support the provincial jurisdictions in drawing up their plans and to require their preparation. The provinces had three years from December 2020, that is, until December 2023, to prepare and approve their PRP, which must then be updated every five years.

Question asked and information provided

Information was requested on progress and conclusions regarding the PRPs. The administration replied that, at the date of the response, no province had a PRP validated by the national enforcement authority. It stated that some provinces had published their plans, but these had not been validated.

It added that the provinces of La Pampa, Misiones and Jujuy had completed the pre-validation process for their drafts, having presented them to the Provincial Coordination Roundtable during 2024 without receiving binding objections. It then attached a map showing the current status.

Chart provided

Assessment of the response

Based on the information provided, it is clear that the provinces have failed to meet the deadlines set by the regulations. The status reported suggests that, with the exception of three, the provincial jurisdictions will not validate their Provincial Response Plans (PRP) any time soon.

It should be noted that, under the regulations cited, the National Enforcement Authority is responsible for requesting response plans from each province. Given the current state of progress, it would be appropriate for the Authority to strengthen the mechanisms needed to support the preparation of response plans, so as to coordinate the different measures and actions for developing and implementing instruments that, in addition to serving provincial climate management, necessarily affect national instruments such as the National Adaptation and Mitigation Plan, the third NDC and the periodic transparency reports.

Because of its cross-border and interconnected nature, the climate problem requires comprehensive management. The effects of climate change vary according to the vulnerability of the natural and human systems in each territory. The same applies to the contribution each production model makes to greenhouse gas emissions.

In a federal state, where climate-related environmental policies depend largely on the provinces, it is difficult for the national body to respond to climate challenges without local action. In practical and legal terms, the central State cannot intervene in the development of local matters that are known to the provincial administrations themselves. A national response lacking the agreement, input and coordinated effort of the provinces would sideline local socio-environmental and climate demands, thereby hindering a comprehensive approach.

  • On climate finance

Question asked and information provided

Finally, information was requested on the existence of specific funding for the preparation of the third NDC or for implementing the actions and measures committed to in previous NDCs, their level of execution and their legal basis.

In response, the Administration stated that there were no specific funding allocations for the preparation of the third NDC. As regards funding for climate measures in general, it referred to Chapter 3 of the Fifth Biennial Update Report.

Assessment of the response

The reference to the fifth biennial report does not match the period for which information was requested, as that report was submitted in 2023 and the periods covered for finance correspond to 2021–2022. Notwithstanding the answer given, the information sought can be obtained from the Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) submitted in 2024. Its Chapter 4 sets out the financial support needed and received nationally during 2023.

In this regard, the BTR states that current and active projects for 2022–2023 involved disbursements of USD 1,082 million. It defines climate finance as finance linked to projects and actions that contribute to mitigation or adaptation, provided that it comes from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Fund and Parties included in Annex II of the UNFCCC, or other multilateral institutions.

As for the distribution of these amounts, the report shows that 23% went to mitigation actions, 4% to adaptation actions and 73% to cross-cutting actions, that is, activities with an impact on both mitigation and adaptation. It also states that the financial institutions with the largest shares of finance are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), with 37% (23 projects), and the World Bank (WB), with 27% (17 projects). In terms of funds disbursed, 66% corresponds to IDB finance, followed by 19% from the WB and 8% from the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF). In total, the 63 funded projects are listed and detailed. The table shows 37 ongoing projects and 23 completed ones, most of them infrastructure projects.

From the data reviewed, it can be concluded that, at national level, the Argentine Republic has multiple sources of multilateral finance for climate action. The amounts received by the country can be considered substantial. Moreover, many of these funded projects are ongoing or already completed, which shows that the funds have actually been used. A deeper analysis of the variables would make it possible to examine the sector they are allocated to (agriculture, water and sanitation, forests, etc.), their positive and negative socio-environmental impacts, the degree of social consensus or dissent regarding their implementation and the citizen participation mechanisms used, among other indicators. Breaking down and assessing these data is beyond the scope of this document. It is also important to have reports that provide transparency and allow each project to be monitored individually.

CONCLUSION

The information requested and the answers received allow a general assessment of the development and progress of significant climate policies, actions and measures in the light of national and international commitments. From a procedural standpoint, it can be concluded that the information provided was relatively complete, apart from certain points noted that relate to the remit of other bodies. In this respect, the references to official documents via hyperlinks are worth highlighting. This makes it possible to check the information provided against the specific administrative acts, which increases transparency.

With regard to the international commitments made by the Argentine Republic, there is an intention to begin preparing the third NDC ahead of 2025. However, efforts will need to increase considerably to achieve this goal. Comparing the work required to produce an ambitious NDC with the number of meetings held for this purpose within the National Climate Change Cabinet (only three), it is hard to see the goal being met at this pace of work.

Along these lines, it is essential to integrate and consolidate key institutional spaces for the participatory development of the instruments mentioned. In this respect, setting up the External Advisory Council is a fundamental step that must be taken ahead of 2025. The same applies to consolidating the work of the Focal Points Roundtable, a fundamental part of the GNCC. This is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges observed.

That said, the timely submission of the first Biennial Transparency Report can be assessed positively. Although it had not been completed at the time of the request, its completion and submission can be verified through government portals. While the data it presents merit closer examination, they are broadly consistent with the State’s previous biennial reports. It also addresses the same relevant variables and follows an appropriate structure, as in earlier communications. This shows the importance of ensuring the continuity of working teams so that they can be consolidated, regardless of political affiliation, a pattern that should also be reflected in climate policy and action, since it matters when it comes to recognising, validating and building on progress already made in line with the principles of progressiveness and non-regression.

As regards foreign policy on climate, the national government’s decision to withdraw its official delegation from COP29 is deeply concerning. It represents a clear step backwards from the country’s historic participation in these multilateral negotiations. It deprives the State of any possibility of taking part in dialogue with other States and affects its chances of accessing multilateral finance, all the more so given that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities on climate places the Argentine Republic in a favourable position to access climate finance. Under Article 4(8), Argentina is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change because it has extensive low-lying coastal areas, arid and semi-arid zones, areas exposed to forest degradation, areas prone to drought and desertification, areas with high urban air pollution, and fragile mountain ecosystems, among other conditions. In this regard, Argentina has access to multilateral finance on a considerable scale. This may be due in part to its active participation in international forums and its commitment to tackling climate change.

In addition, there is a severe knock-on effect. The decision to withdraw the official delegation had a negative impact on the people who had been accredited as party advisers for the Argentine Republic. It clearly affected the ability of civil society members to take part, as they lost their accreditation. This situation was not only covered by the media but was also raised with the COP organisers, who had to urgently accredit these people as observers. It may well project a negative image of Argentina’s real commitment to climate negotiations. It should be noted here that climate action cannot and must not depend solely on access to international finance, as domestic capital flows must also serve the commitments made. In this sense, defunding research, public works, institutions dealing with environmental issues, and related programmes and policies has a severe impact on meeting internationally agreed targets.

On another note, the Provincial Response Plans give cause for concern. Beyond the failure of all jurisdictions to meet the deadlines, there is no significant progress suggesting that, with the exception of three provinces, they will meet their obligations in the short term. This poses a serious problem for designing comprehensive climate action that also addresses the specific vulnerabilities of each area. Climate change requires a differentiated yet comprehensive approach because, as noted, its causes and effects transcend political borders. Tackling climate action at national level without implementing concrete local measures means overlooking a central aspect that belongs to the local level. Specific, local problems will be resolved only insofar as policies and actions address local perspectives and issues. Without this approach, any measure that fails to address the concrete impacts of climate change is bound to fail and to perpetuate the negative effects on the fundamental rights of human and non-human persons.

(1) Argentina. National Congress. (1993). Law No. 24.295. Approving the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

(2) Argentina. National Congress. (2016). Law No. 27.270. Approving the Paris Agreement.

(3) Argentina. National Congress. (2001). Law No. 25.438. Approving the Kyoto Protocol.

(4) Argentina. National Congress. (2019). Law No. 27.520. Minimum standards for adaptation to and mitigation of global climate change. Official Gazette of the Argentine Republic, 20 December 2019, issue 34266, p. 4.

(5) Milei, J. (January 2024). Speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) [Conference]. Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), Washington D.C., United States.

(6) Milei, J. (September 2024). Remarks by President Javier Milei in the general debate of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, United States [Speech]. Casa Rosada. https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/

(7) Ibid.

(8) United Nations. (2024). Pact for the Future. Resolution A/RES/79/1. New York: United Nations.

(9) Argentine National Congress. (May 2021). Law No. 27.566. Approving the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, adopted in Escazú, Republic of Costa Rica, on 4 March 2018.

(10) Law No. 25.831, Art. 8.

(11) This consists of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C, recognising that limiting the increase to 1.5 °C would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.

(12) Conference of the Parties (COP). (2015). Adoption of the Paris Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

(13) Available at: https://ciam.ambiente.gob.ar/images/uploaded/recursos/568/IF-2024-111741006-APN-SSAM-JGM.pdf

(14) Conference of the Parties (COP). (2015). Adoption of the Paris Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

(15) Available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/645001 and at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/argentina-presento-su-primer-informe-bienal-de-transparencia

(16) Available at: https://www.youtube.com/live/oFPjqpnXXmQ

(17) DW. (2024). Argentina withdraws from COP29. Retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/es/cambio-clim%C3%A1tico-argentina-retira-su-delegaci%C3%B3n-de-la-cop29/a-70784952

(18) Representatives of the State Party may take part in the COP; they make up the official delegations. However, “party advisers” (party overflow) may join as an “ancillary” part of that delegation. Strictly speaking, holding this type of accreditation does not mean being part of the delegation representing the State, as the holder cannot speak on behalf of the State or access closed negotiations. Civil society members commonly obtain this type of badge to attend the COP. Another possibility is for civil society (NGOs) to be accredited as observers independently of the delegation.